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Abstract
This project addressed JFSP project announcement FA-FRA09-001, and the task statement
“Trade-off assessments of AMR decisions”. The project evaluated the consequences of
alternative responses to 2007 and 2008 wildland fires in three wilderness areas. Specifically, it
examined alternative initial response strategies and what could have happened if ignitions had
been allowed to burn. Consequences were quantified in terms of area and type of area burned,
days of fire activity, and impact on landscape scale fire risk. Situational factors were also
examined for their influence on the response strategy and outcome. Simulations of three case
study extended duration fires were also done to look for evidence that earlier fire and fuels
treatments had influenced the outcomes, and for evidence that a critical decision early in the
management of one of the examples influenced outcomes.
Background and Purpose
This purpose of this project was to gain insight about the tradeoffs surrounding Appropriate
Management Responses (AMR) decisions. Federal fire management policy allows for a wide
range of AMR on any incident (National Interagency Fire Center 2001). Alternative responses
range from aggressive suppression to passive fire monitoring to intermediate strategies such as
confine and contain approaches. During 2007 and 2008, there was an increased effort in several
regions to more fully implement this policy, and an increased number of ignitions were managed
as longer duration events.
To make such decisions to manage longer duration fires, managers need to anticipate the
consequences of their fire management decisions. These consequences include the risks and
benefits of both suppressing ignitions and allowing them to burn. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
conceptualize the risks, benefits and costs of actions not taken. Quite often it’s only the short
term immediate outcomes that can be imagined and the longer term future consequences are
ignored. In particular, it is difficult to see the potential ecological benefits that are foregone
when an ignition is aggressively suppressed at initial attack.
This project used methods developed during previous efforts to quantify the foregone benefits of
fire when an ignition is suppressed (Miller and Davis 2009). These methods employ the use of
retrospective fire growth simulation wherein the growth and behavior of an ignition that was
suppressed at some point in the past are simulated using knowledge of the weather and fuels
conditions that existed at the time of the ignition. The hypothetical “what-if” outcomes from the
ignition being allowed to burn are then compared to the actual observed scenario in which the
ignition was suppressed at initial attack.
Study Description and Location
We focused our study on three wilderness areas where the preferred and desirable AMR for
lightning-caused ignitions is passive fire monitoring. In wilderness, it is critically important that

managers fully exploit their opportunities to allow natural ignitions to burn. Data for all three
wilderness areas were buffered by 5 km.
Our first study area was the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness (SBW; 0.5 million-ha) on the border
of north-central Idaho and western Montana. Elevations range from 430-3070 m. The vegetation
ranges from open stands of ponderosa pine at lower elevations, to mixed conifer forests at
intermediate elevations, to whitebark pine, alpine larch, and Engelmann spruce at higher
elevations. The area experiences a mixed severity fire regime: many fires are nonlethal surface
fires but under suitable weather and fuel conditions, lethal surface fires and even stand replacing
crown fires occur. Within the wilderness boundary, unplanned ignitions are often allowed to
burn, although if a threat is perceived to the wildland-urban interface outside the wilderness, fires
within the wilderness are often controlled.
The second study area, the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex (BMWC) in northwestern
Montana (621,600 ha), runs for 60 miles along the Continental Divide, with elevations ranging
from 1,200 m to more than 2,800 m. The area is characterized by rugged ridge tops that slope
down onto alpine meadows, heavily forested hillsides, and timbered river valleys. Similar to the
Selway-Bitterroot, the area experiences a mixed severity fire regime, and within the wilderness
boundary, ignitions are often allowed to burn.
The third study was the Gila-Aldo Leopold Wilderness (GALW; 307,800 ha) in west-central
New Mexico. The GALW ranges in elevation from 1380m to 3310m and features steep
mountains, rough deep canyons, flat mesas, large river channels and flood plains. Vegetation
ranges from desert scrub at the lowest elevations, through pinon-juniper woodlands and
ponderosa pine and Douglas fir forests at middle elevations, to subalpine forests at the highest
elevations. Fires are frequent in most of the study area and typically of low severity. Fire
management objectives are to return fire to its natural role in the wilderness ecosystem to the
maximum extent possible, consistent with safety of persons, property, and other resources.
The project had two parts. In part 1, we considered the initial response strategy. We evaluated
the consequences of alternative responses to 2007 and 2008 wildland fires in the three study
areas. We characterized the consequences of strategies that were actually implemented and
contrasted those with what could have happened had alternative strategies and tactics been used.
In particular, we examined what could have happened if ignitions had been allowed to burn. We
quantified consequences in terms of area and type of area burned, days of fire activity, and
impact on landscape scale fire risk. We also examined how situational factors (location and
timing of ignition, national and regional preparedness level, fire activity in the area, and fire
weather indices) influenced the response strategy and outcome. In part 2, our intent was to
conduct in-depth analyses of two case study extended duration fires to compare and contrast the
actual outcomes of key decisions and tactics with alternatives. For two case study fires, we
looked for evidence that earlier fire and fuels treatments had influenced the outcomes from the

incident. For a third case study fire, we looked for evidence that a critical decision early in the
incident management influenced outcomes.
This project used a combination of data, modeling platforms, and analyses to compare the results
of a fire management decision made to the potential results if a different decision had been made.
The project relied most heavily on two fire modeling platforms. The first, FARSITE (Finney
2004), was used to retrospectively simulate the growth and behavior of suppressed ignitions if
they had been allowed to burn (part 1). FARSITE was also used to simulate the growth and
behavior of three case study fires (part 2). We followed previously developed methods for these
retrospective simulations (Davis et al. 2010). The output from these simulations was used to
compare the actual outcomes that did occur with the potential outcomes that might have
occurred, for example, if these suppressed ignitions had been allowed to burn (i.e. “what-if?”
fires in part 1). Outcomes were summarized in terms of fire duration, fire size, area burned by
resource type (e.g., wilderness vs. non-wilderness, sensitive species habitat, etc.) and severity of
burn. The second platform, FSim (Finney et al. 2011), was used to evaluate the potential
outcomes of these “what-if?” fires in terms of future fire risk. Because the potential—or the
perceived potential—for a wilderness fire to spread beyond the wilderness boundary is
something that currently constrains a wilderness manager’s decision space (Black et al. 2008),
we used FSim to generate maps depicting the likelihood of wilderness fire escapes.
Key Findings:
1. If additional ignitions had been allowed to burn in 2007 and 2008, substantially more
area could have seen wildfire in all three study areas.
All ignitions from 2007 and 2008 that occurred within the three study areas (wilderness buffered
by 5-km) were mapped and described. Successfully suppressed ignitions at initial attack were
identified and selected for the FARSITE simulations. Ignitions included those that started inside
wilderness as well as those that started in the 5-km non-wilderness buffer. We quantified the
amount of area that these simulated fires would have added to the observed fire activity.
In the SBW, it was found that four times as much area could have burned in this study area. For
2007, we simulated the outcomes of 40 fires which would have added 315,879 acres of burned
area to the 105,081 acres that actually did burn, and for 2008 we simulated 14 fires which would
have added 43,134 acres to the 9,494 acres that actually did burn. In the BMWC, 25 simulated
fires in 2007 would have added 266,747 acres to the 188,069 that actually did burn; and 12
simulated fires in 2008 would have added 30,807 acres to the 587 acres that actually did burn. In
the GALW, we simulated the outcomes of 32 fires in 2007 and 26 fires in 2008. Simulations
suggest that a lot more could have burned, adding over 223,736 acres to the 19,972 acres that did
burn in 2007 and over 675,000 acres to the 1,431 acres that burned in 2008.
2. Allowing more naturally occurring wilderness fires to burn in 2007 and 2008 would
have made measurable progress toward restoring wilderness fire regimes.

Several of the simulated fires were wilderness ignitions that would have escaped onto adjacent
lands and a few were human caused ignitions. Although written fire management policy
technically supports the use of human-caused ignitions for resource benefits, they are rarely, if
ever, considered as candidates for fire use. Similarly, although fire management plans and policy
guidance are increasingly permissive of managing for resource benefits on non-wilderness lands,
the reality is that if a fire is likely to escape the wilderness, it is usually not viewed as a candidate
for fire use. Managers cannot know for sure which ignitions will stay within wilderness and
which will escape, but the retrospective simulations provided the benefit of hindsight. The
analysis focused on the outcomes that resulted from the simulations of lightning-caused ignitions
that started inside wilderness and did not escape the wilderness. These were thought of as
unexploited or missed opportunities to use natural wilderness fire and were referred to as
additional candidate ignitions for fire use.
In the SBW, simulations suggested that these additional candidate ignitions would have added
about 20% to the area that did burn in wilderness in 2007 (17,591 acres added to the 96,499 acres
that did burn). In 2008, fire use candidates would have added 3,628 to 364 that actually did burn.
If these opportunities had been exploited, the fire rotation for the wilderness would have been
reduced from 81 years to 77 years (based on a 27 year period 1984-2010). This reduction would
have made marginal progress toward pre-settlement fire rotation estimates of around 44 years. In
the BMWC, candidate fire use ignitions could have doubled the wilderness area burned in 2007
(adding 139,723 acres to the 140,576 acres that did burn) and in 2008, such fires would have
increased the area burned in wilderness ten-fold (adding 5,078 acres to 578 acres). As a result,
the fire rotation would have decreased from 196 to 162 years. In the BMWC, restoration targets
of 100,000 to 200,000 acres burned per decade have been estimated. A 162-year fire rotation
corresponds roughly to the lower target, suggesting that these additional candidate ignitions
would have essentially restored a natural rate of burning. In the GALW, candidate ignitions
would have tripled the wilderness area burned in 2007 (adding 42,128 acres to 17,049 acres that
actually burned), and increased the wilderness area burned in 2008 by one hundred-fold (adding
41,355 acres to 411 acres that actually burned). This additional area burned would have
marginally reduced the fire rotation from 38.6 to 33.4 years.
3. The majority of opportunities to use natural wilderness fires were exploited by
managers of these study areas during these two years.
All three study areas have a history and experience with allowing naturally ignited wilderness
fires to burn. The SBW and the GALW are especially well known for their wilderness fire
programs and are considered national, if not international, leaders in this practice. Outcomes of
the FARSITE simulations and the knowledge gained from this hindsight were used to assess how
fully opportunities to use natural fire in wilderness were exploited in these three study areas. The
number of lightning-caused wilderness ignitions that were suppressed but that might have been
allowed to burn without escaping the wilderness boundary was examined.

In keeping with its reputation, the SBW managed far more wilderness ignitions as WFU than as
wildfires during 2007 and 2008. In 2007, although 13 wilderness ignitions were suppressed,
there were 49 ignitions managed as WFU. These 49 WFUs were managed as two complexes. Of
the 13 wilderness ignitions that were suppressed, 2 of these escaped initial attack but ultimately
burned mostly without intervention and in fact were managed along with the two large WFU
complexes. Another of the 13 suppressed wilderness ignitions was determined to be a “nonstarter”, and we did not simulate it because the subsequent weather conditions would have
precluded it from spreading. Of the remaining 10 wilderness ignitions that were suppressed,
simulations suggest that 7 of these would have escaped the wilderness boundary. This would
have left only 3 wilderness ignitions that would have stayed within the wilderness boundary and
therefore may have been missed opportunities to use natural fire within the wilderness. These
three ignitions represent less than 5% of the wilderness ignitions in 2007. In 2008, seven
wilderness ignitions were suppressed and 18 were managed as WFU. Two of the suppressed
ignitions were determined to be “non-starters” and one escaped initial attack to burn 2500 acres.
Simulations of the remaining four suggest that none of them would have escaped the wilderness
boundary. One of these was human-caused, leaving three missed opportunities to use natural fire
in the wilderness. These three represent 12% of the wilderness ignitions in 2008.
Overall, the BMWC had fewer opportunities for WFU compared with the SBW. In 2007, 19
wilderness ignitions were suppressed while 5 were managed as WFU. One of the WFUs was
later converted to suppression status and ultimately grew to 60,000 acres. Of the 19 wilderness
ignitions that were suppressed, 7 escaped initial attack and one was determined to be a “nonstarter.” Simulations of the remaining 11 suggest that eight would have stayed within the
wilderness boundary. One of these was human-caused, and another one was in a zone identified
in the fire management plan as a fire exclusion zone, leaving six missed opportunities to use
natural wilderness fire. These six represent 25% of the wilderness ignitions in 2007. It should be
noted that two of these missed opportunities occurred when a large high complexity suppression
fire was being actively suppressed; under the circumstances, it would have been difficult to allow
these wilderness ignitions to burn. In 2008, there were only a total of eight wilderness ignitions
and five of these were managed as WFU. Simulations of the three that were suppressed suggest
that two of them would have stayed within the wilderness. One of these, however, was humancaused and in the fire exclusion zone, leaving one missed opportunity to use natural fire in
wilderness. This single ignition represents 13% of the wilderness ignitions in 2008.
The GALW had many opportunities to use natural wilderness ignitions. In 2007 there were 30
wilderness ignitions were suppressed and 18 were managed as WFU. Twelve of the suppressed
ignitions were “non-starters.” Simulations of the remaining 18 suppressed wilderness ignitions
suggest that 5 would have escaped the wilderness boundary, leaving 13 missed opportunities to
use natural wilderness fire. These 13 ignitions represent 27% of the wilderness ignitions in 2007.
In 2008, 17 wilderness ignitions were suppressed and 8 were managed as WFU. Simulations
suggest that 6 of the suppressed ignitions would have escaped the wilderness boundary. Of the

remaining 11 ignitions, one was human-caused, leaving ten missed opportunities to use natural
wilderness fire. These ten represent 40% of the wilderness ignitions in 2008.
4. The most important situational factor influencing the initial response strategy was
ignition location.
Multiple situational factors were examined for their influence on the initial response strategy
decision: location, timing in the fire season, national preparedness level (PL), regional PL, the
number of active fires in the study area, and the Energy Release Component (ERC) at the time of
the ignition. The initial response strategy for wilderness ignitions depended most strongly on the
ignition’s distance from the wilderness boundary; the more interior an ignition, the more likely it
was allowed to burned. This was consistently true across all study areas. This influence was
strongest in the SBW, which has the most populated and geographically expansive WUI of the
three study areas.
In the SBW, additional factors that were significant were timing in the fire season, regional PL,
national PL, and the number of active fires in the study area at the time of the ignition. Fires
were more likely to be allowed to burn if they occurred later in the season, occurred when PLs
were higher, and when current fire activity was higher. The influence of timing in the fire season
intuitive: with fewer days remaining in the fire season, fires that are allowed to burn pose less of
a risk of escape. The influence of higher PLs and fire activity may seem counterintuitive because
allowing a new fire to burn would be a decision to add to the workload and complexity in a time
of limited resources. In this case, however, this relationship was mostly a function of two large
complexes of multiple WFU fires that were being managed in 2007, a very active fire season.
This could indicate that opportunities for using natural wilderness fire are being exploited even
in the height of the season. In the BMWC, additional factors that were significant were regional
PL, national PL and to a lesser degree, number of active of fires in the study area at the time of
ignition. The relationship was opposite to the relationship in the SBW; in the BMWC, fires were
more likely to be allowed to burn if they occurred when PLs and current fire activity were lower.
The start date of the ignition was not a significant factor in the BMWC. In the GALWC, no
factors other than distance to boundary were significant.
5. The highest risk wilderness ignitions paradoxically have the greatest potential to reduce
future risk of escaped fires.
The BMWC was used as a case study area to explore the role of wildfires on mitigating future
risk. Specifically, the effect that the “what-if” simulated fires would have had on reducing the
likelihood of future wilderness fire escapes was quantified. Escape probability was computed
from ignitions and wildfire perimeters simulated by FSim. This probability was computed for the
observed landscapes after 2007 and 2008 and for alternative landscapes that reflected the effects
of each of the “what-if” simulated fires on fuels and vegetation. The most dramatic differences in
average escape probabilities were created by the “what-if” fires that ignited closest to the

wilderness boundary (Figure 1). Although these ignitions near the boundary may be at higher
risk to escape, they also have the potential to create fuel breaks for future fires.

Figure 1. Change in average EP within the treatment fire perimeters plotted against the distance from the treatment
fire’s ignition point to the BMWC boundary. Negative distance values indicate locations outside the BMWC
boundary.

We also computed the size of the area within the wilderness that had very low escape
probabilities (<0.01). Ignitions starting in this zone would have very low likelihood of escaping
the wilderness, and therefore represent the greatest opportunities for being allowed to burn.
However, the size of this low risk zone was most influenced by the largest simulated fires which
could be the most difficult and riskiest fires to manage (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Change in area for each EP class within treated areas between the observed and individual-alternative
scenarios. Positive values indicate more area in the alternative scenario relative to the observed scenario, while
negative values represent less area in the alternative scenario; bars for a single fire sum to zero because gains in one
EP class are offset by losses in another. The treatment fires are ordered along the x-axis by area burned inside the
BMWC boundary; size of each treatment fire is provided in parentheses.

6. If additional ignitions had been allowed to burn in 2007 and 2008, estimates of future
annualized area burned and suppression costs would have been reduced.
The role of wildfires as fuel treatments that would reduce future suppression expenditures was
examined for the BMWC. Using FSim, wildfires for 25,000 artificial fire seasons were simulated
for the observed landscapes after 2007 and 2008 and for alternative landscapes that reflected the
effects of the “what-if” simulated fires on fuels and vegetation. A suppression cost model was
then linked to the wildfire perimeters generated by FSim and annualized suppression costs were
computed at the landscape scale. The “what-if” fires from 2007 would have reduced annualized
mean area burned in a subsequent fire season by 17% and would have reduced mean suppression
costs in a subsequent fire season by 20%. The “what-if” fires from 2008 affected much less area

than those from 2007 and these would have reduced the mean area burned by only 3% and costs
by only 2%.
7. Insufficient data on costs and tactics significantly hinders our ability to learn from past
decisions and their outcomes.
One of the project goals was to evaluate the economic effectiveness of wildfire management
decisions, which requires the pairing of relatively fine scale spatial data about where specific
suppression actions were taken with daily information on quantity and cost of resources used.
Specific incident documents (e.g. Situation Reports) provide broad descriptions of where
different suppression resources are allocated within broad geographic areas, but there were no
reliable spatially explicit data to describe actual management decisions at a given location. This
data gap hinders the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of suppression resources in terms of
altering fire spread, intensity, and improving the likelihood of containment (Holmes and Calkin
2012; Finney et al. 2009), and therefore hinders the ability to learn from previous incidents.
Though substantial energy was devoted to acquiring daily incident cost data by resource type for
all our fires from I-Suite, we were only marginally successful with this. While we were able to
obtain daily management costs for our three extended duration case study fires, we were unable
to obtain data for the other fires in the study areas which limited our ability to extrapolate beyond
these case study fires. Yet even with the daily management cost data, it was difficult to discern
why suppression costs vary throughout the duration of a fire without spatial data. Furthermore,
costs were not broken down by resource type and quantity which limited our ability to evaluate
differences between tactical approaches on these fires.
8. The evaluation of the economic efficiency of fire management decisions remains an
intractable problem.
Currently, there are no formal economic evaluation frameworks for fire and fuels management.
Instead, decision-making in wildfire and fuels management has embraced a quantitative riskassessment framework, predicated on the principles of actuarial sciences, whereby wildfire risk
is formulated by integrating the likelihood, intensity, and positive and negative effects of wildfire
on market and non-market resources, and is calculated in terms of ‘net value change’ (Finney,
2005). Wildfire risk can be broken down into its two main subcomponents: the “exposure
analysis” and “effects analysis”. Exposure analyses examine the spatial relationship between
wildfire likelihood, intensity, and resources at risk, without incorporating how a given resource
at risk might be affected by wildfire at different intensity levels. Effects analyses extend
exposure analyses by including information about the likely response of resources to fire at
different intensity levels. Resource responses can be both positive and negative in attempt to
capture the fact that wildfire can be both beneficial and destructive to a given resource depending
on fire intensity (e.g. critical habitat).

Conceptually, the quantitative risk assessment framework can be used along with suppression
cost models to evaluate the economic efficiency of alternative wildfire management strategies.
Attempts were made to incorporate monetary estimates for market and non-market resources into
the risk assessment framework to calculate a dollar value of expected resources at risk. By
comparing these estimates with expected suppression expenditures, the objective was to flag
certain “what-if” fires as being more or less economically efficient. Unfortunately, there are
several significant limitations to such an approach that hindered the ability to economically
evaluate alternative wildfire management strategies.
One set of limitations surrounds the development of appropriate response functions which serve
as the foundation in effects analyses. These response functions represent the ‘value change’ for a
given resource as a function of fire intensity level. Putting a value on changes in market and
nonmarket resources due to wildfire is challenging and as a result value change has often been
quantified in terms of percentage change (Venn and Calkin 2011). However, it is unclear exactly
what percentage change means in the context of non-market resources at risk. Is it the change in
physical amount of the resource, or the change in how society views that resource after it is
affected? Value change has also been represented as an area based metric (Thompson et al.
2011), yet such a metric may not appropriately represent risk to the provision of market and nonmarket resources. Rather than using an area based metric to quantify value change, it is
theoretically feasible to assign a value to each resource in the risk analysis, and using the
response function approach, estimate the expected value change measured in terms of dollars for
a given landscape. While theoretically appealing, there are drawbacks to incorporating nonmarket estimates derived from non-market valuation studies into the wildfire risk framework in
order to economically evaluate wildfire and fuels management. Transferring estimates from
non-market valuation studies into wildfire risk analyses assumes that the interpretation of the
non-market value is compatible with the use of response functions to characterize changes in the
level of that resource. An example of this is with valuing changes to critical habitat. Most of the
geospatial data related to critical habitat represents areas on the landscape where critical habitat
exists. However, most non-market valuation studies do not elicit information on societal values
towards enhancing or avoiding loss of critical habitat; generally, such studies capture society’s
willingness to prevent the extinction of the species that occupies the critical habitat. Transferring
an estimate of the value of protecting the extinction of an animal onto geospatial data
representing critical habitat is not appropriate because they do not represent the same thing. The
same can be said for estimating the value change due to wildfire for biodiversity, smoke
management, and fisheries. The interpretation of the non-market resource value rarely aligns
with the spatial data used to represent the spatial distribution of the resource.
Another fundamental limitation to evaluating the economic efficiency of fire management
decisions is lack of data and knowledge about the costs of managing a wildfire with less
aggressive strategies. Recent attempts to disentangle differences in management strategies on
suppression costs have been hindered by a lack of and inconsistencies in reported data on

suppression costs for fires that were not aggressively suppressed (Gebert and Black 2012).
Additionally, such data are often confounded because information derived from decision
documents about management strategy does not always reflect how the wildfire was actually
managed on the ground.
As a result of the intractability associated with valuation, response functions, and effects
analysis, efforts focused instead on the use of exposure analysis to evaluate efficiency of the
“what-if” fires. The effect of these fires on altering the likelihood that subsequent wilderness
ignitions would escape the wilderness boundary was evaluated (see Finding #5). Information
from the exposure analysis was also linked with a suppression cost model to evaluate their effect
on expenditures at the landscape scale (see Finding #6).
9. Retrospective fire behavior modeling was unsuccessful for evaluating management
decisions in the context of the extended response strategy.
The original aim of part 2 of the project was to use retrospective fire behavior simulation to
evaluate outcomes that might have resulted from alternative decisions on extended duration case
study incidents. This aim proved to be unrealistic given the information we were able to collect,
the expertise we had for the fire behavior modeling, and the particulars of the weather and terrain
of the case study fires. In general, we were only marginally successfully in calibrating the
FARSITE parameters to observed fire progression data. Detailed information on the actual
suppression actions taken were lacking, as was information on the effectiveness of these actions.
For two case study fires (Ahorn and Fool Creek, both in 2007), we looked for evidence that
earlier fire and fuels treatments had influenced the outcomes from the incident. Unfortunately,
tor these two fires, weather data, specifically wind data, appeared to be unrepresentative of actual
conditions. These same two case study fires grew substantially under extreme weather conditions
with reported plume dominated fire behavior and long distance spotting. Long distance spotting
seemed to be particularly important to the growth of one of these fires, as it spread through an
area with numerous large natural barriers. Unfortunately, FARSITE simulations were unable to
replicate this kind of fire behavior. Although adjustments were made to the FARSITE parameters
to more closely calibrate the simulations with observations, we did not have high confidence in
our results. For the third case study fire (Lane 2, 2008), we looked for evidence that a critical
decision early in the incident management influenced outcomes and examined the first 24 hours
after this decision. No substantial difference in the outcomes was apparent.
Management Implications
The risk averse decision to suppress is more likely for ignitions close to the wilderness boundary.
And yet the decision to suppress is a decision to delay or put off that fire to a later date.
Conversely, the decision to allow fire to burn is more likely if the fire is expected to stay small
and more likely when the ignition is far from the wilderness boundary (and the built environment
with its associated values at risk). The three study areas we looked at are large and have a

reputation for natural wilderness fire management for good reason. Ignitions can be allowed to
burn because they are remote. The size of the wilderness area confers a large decision space.
These study areas also have a legacy from a history of decisions and that legacy takes the form of
a fuel mosaic and lower landscape fire risk. It appears that all three of these study areas are
exploiting the opportunities they have for natural wilderness fires more often than not, and this is
the case even in extreme record setting weather conditions and high fire activity. Even so, the
restoration of natural fire regimes is not complete and missed opportunities were identified in
2007 and 2008. These missed opportunities were relatively close to the boundary. Paradoxically,
these may be the most important opportunities because of their ability to alter landscape fire risk.
The highest risk ignitions may be the most important risks to take in the long term.
Relationship to recent findings
Recently published studies relate to at least three aspects of this project: retrospective fire
modeling, use of wildfire probabilities for supporting fire management decisions, and cost
modeling in counterfactual scenarios.
Cochrane et al. (2012) used FARSITE in a retrospective mode to create fire spread maps for 14
large wildfires that interacted with previously implemented fuels treatments. Their purpose was
to assess the effectiveness of these fuel treatments in reducing the size of the wildfires. Similar to
our approach with the three case study fires, they used information about the weather that existed
at the time of the fire. After calibrating the simulation parameters to observed progression data,
they then ran a counterfactual scenario in which the previous fuel treatments were omitted. This
required data manipulations similar to those done in this project. Their methods differed notably
in their use of the stochastic spotting feature in FARSITE. Our simulations did not use this
feature; spots were manually introduced when needed to reproduce perimeters. In Cochrane et
al., multiple simulations were run to account for stochastic spotting, thereby allowing wildfire
perimeters, and the effectiveness of the fuel treatments, to be presented in terms of probabilities.
This is a valuable improvement over the methods used here.
Scott et al. (2012) used FSim to compute the probability that wilderness fires would reach a
wildland urban interface. They demonstrated that this risk could be mitigated by selectively
suppressing ignitions, and made these selections based on time in the season and tabulated
results by month. Their approach employed a probabilistic metric very similar to the escape
probability generated in this project. The approaches differ in two important ways. First, the
escape probability represents an entire fire season and does not capture the within-season
influences that the Scott et al. (2012) did. Second, Scott et al. (2012) presented their results
aspatially, whereas maps of escape probability show this information spatially. A
straightforward improvement to escape probability would be to stratify the ignitions in FSim by
date so that escape probability reflects temporal dynamics within a fire season.

Houtman et al. (2013) estimated expected reduction in future suppression costs from allowing
wildfire to burn, and discounted this value into the future. They looked at 50 different futures for
wildfire treatments. In each future, they modeled fire probabilities, fire duration, suppression
effectiveness rates, and used a state and transition model of vegetation change. A suppression
cost model was then used to estimate the suppression costs throughout these futures. This was
compared to a future without the initial wildfire treatment. Treatments tended to reduce future
costs and these results were sensitive to the size of the initial fire of interest because it treated
more area. This is consistent with our findings that larger treatment fires tended to reduce escape
probability. It is also consistent with findings that annualized suppression costs decrease with
increasing amount of area treated. We did not attempt to project discounted future effects but the
state and transition model approach could be incorporated into escape probability analysis to
enable future discounting of treatments effects. Thompson et al. (2013) also quantified the
effects of fuel treatments on suppression costs. Very similar to what was done in this project,
they used FSIM to produce fire size distributions on a treated and untreated landscape and then
used a regression cost model to compare the suppression costs with similar results to what we
found.
Future work needed
The use of FSim to derive escape probability could lead to several fruitful research and
applications. The escape probability map can be classified into zones that might be used in fire
management plan guidance. Exploring how the different zones defined by the classes of escape
probability change throughout a fire season may help identify windows of opportunity to allow
wilderness fires to burn when the escape risk is acceptably low (Scott et al., 2012). Being able to
examine these temporal dynamics would be especially valuable for smaller wilderness areas. The
three study areas in this project are large and have opportunities for managing natural wilderness
fire every year. A small wilderness area may only see viable opportunities late in the season, or
only in certain years. Ignitions could be stratified by time in the fire season, or even by
annualized climate variables, before generating maps of escape probability. The result could
identify those windows, albeit narrow ones, in which natural wilderness fire is a viable option. It
may also be possible to disentangle the apparent complex interactions between terrain, fuels,
ignitions, and weather on escape probability within and adjacent to wildfire treatment areas
through the use of a simulation experiment. In such an experiment, thousands of artificial
wildfire treatments could be generated, wherein treatment size, location, shape, and orientation
are systematically varied. Similar simulation approaches have been used to isolate the relative
importance of different landscape variables on burn probability (e.g. Parisien et al., 2010). As in
Scott et al. (2012) it should be noted that the approach can be applied to non-wilderness
boundary or point of interest. Escape probability could also provide a useful framework for
future research into the optimal placement of mechanical or prescribed fire treatments. Rather
than thinking of fuels treatments simply as a way to reduce the likelihood and/or intensity of
wildfire, the spatio-temporal placement of fuels treatments could be designed in such a way that

opportunities to allow natural fire within wilderness are expanded (Reinhardt et al., 2008). As
such, escape probability could be used to help integrate the goals of hazardous fuels management
with wildfire management.
There is a critical need to determine how much fires cost to manage over the long duration,
especially when they are being managed for resource benefit objectives. Unfortunately, as
already mentioned, data on costs that are tied to the actual actions taken on an incident are
lacking. However, data being collected in WFDSS should be able to help disentangle differences
in management strategies on management costs.
Deliverables Crosswalk
Deliverable Type (See Format Description
Overview, Section VIII)
Conference/symposia/workshop Meet with staff at each of 3 study
areas and both of the regional
offices to present methods, results,
and implications
• Lewis and Clark NF fire staff,
Great Falls, MT, 6/2011
• Rocky Mountain Ranger
District resource staff, Choteau,
MT, 6/2011
• West Fork Ranger District
resource staff, Darby, MT,
8/2013
• Prescott NF fire and resource
staff, Prescott, AZ, 1/2011
Dataset
Spatial data layers of model inputs
and outputs delivered to each of the
study area management units in
electronic form
Non-refereed publication
In-depth case study reports for
extended response strategy analysis
Non-refereed publication
Fire Management Today article on
initial response strategy analysis
Non-refereed publication
Research in a Nutshell two-page
summary produced by the Aldo
Leopold Wilderness Research
Institute.
Refereed article
Barnett, K.M.; Venn, T.J.; Miller,
C.; Parks, S.A. A use of risk
analysis to support wilderness fire
decisions.
Refereed article
Barnett, K.M. et al. Predicting
changes in wildfire suppression
expenditures due to alternative
wilderness management strategies.

Status
Completed.

To be posted for download
when new website renovation
launches in Spring 2014.
Forthcoming
Forthcoming
Forthcoming

In review. Submitted to Forest
Ecology and Management,
November 2013.
In prep. Forthcoming.

Website

Project webpage on Aldo Leopold
Wilderness Research Institute
website
Conference/symposia/workshop Oral presentation at professional
society conference; AFE or IAWF
• Barnett, K. Economic
evaluation of alternative
wildfire management strategies.
Oral presentation presented at
5th International Fire ecology
and Management Congress, Dec
3-7, 2012, Portland, OR.
Also:
• Barnett, K.M. Application of an
ecosystem services modeling
framework: evaluating the
economic efficiency of
wilderness wildfire
management. Oral presentation
at Valuing Ecosystem Services
Workshop, November 15, 2011,
Lubrecht Experimental Forest,
MT.
Poster
Professional association
conferences, 2010, 2011, 2012
One poster and three oral
presentations instead of three
posters:
• Miller, C., and Davis, B.H.
Retrospective fire modeling to
quantify the hidden
consequences of fire
suppression. Oral presentation
and poster presented at Third
Fire Behavior and Fuel
Conference, October 25-29,
2010, Spokane, WA.
• Miller, C. Assessing fire
management trade-offs: a
Monday-morning quarterback
approach. Oral presentation to
be made at George Wright
Society Biennial Conference,
March 2011, New Orleans, LA.
• Miller, C. Fire management
tradeoffs: three wilderness case
studies. Oral presentation
presented at 5th International
Fire ecology and Management
Congress, Dec 3-7, 2012,

Forthcoming when new website
renovation launches in Spring
2014.
Completed

Completed

Master’s thesis

Portland, OR.
Barnett, K.M. A use of risk analysis
to support wilderness fire decisions.
Thesis, University of Montana.
Annual progress reports, final report

To be defended 12/2013.

Completed.
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